This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.
1. Introduction
Introduction
By 2100, 85% of the world's population is expected to live in metropolitan areas (MAs) (UN, 2013) . 1 Today, this gure already reaches more than 50% of the world's population and roughly 80% of the OECD countries' population. Meanwhile, the economic strength of numerous MAs is comparable to that of countries. MAs cover only 4% of the land area in the OECD countries but account for 55% of their GDP (OECD, 2015) . Because MAs are areas of residence for most people and are creators of substantial economic wealth, their governance is a paramount concern for policy makers worldwide. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy's statement is illustrative: The Greater Paris is at the core of our strategy of attractiveness and economic recovery. This project concerns all elected representatives. 2 The gouvernance of MAs has two outstanding features compared to country governance.
First, MAs are characterized by competition among many sub-metropolitan or local governments (e.g. counties, municipalities, districts, and townships) for mobile jobs and mobile residents. The governance of MAs is split among numerous local governments which often have signicant autonomy to raise local revenue from residential, business and property taxes for example, to nance a range of public services such as schools, amenities (e.g. public parks) and safety. 3 Mobility of private agents and autonomy of local public policy are a fertile ground for competition among local governments.
Second, MAs are characterized by strong agglomeration of jobs in MA centers and high mobility of households as residents and workers. Typically, MAs are composed of a large central city surrounded by numerous small suburban towns. Many workers are attracted by access to jobs and high wages in the central cities which cluster most activities. This concentration of workers (and often also residents) in the central cities creates negative agglomeration externalities such as congestion on amenities and public goods/services and various urban disturbances (noise, waste, etc.) . Expensive housing in the city spurs many residents to settle in suburban towns where rents are more aordable. 4 These suburbanites are often obliged to undertake long commutes to work in the city, which generate negative commuting externalities such as trac congestion and air pollution. 5 1 MAs are urban agglomerations with more than 500 000 inhabitants (OECD, 2015) .
2 Speech presenting the Greater Paris project delivered on April 29, 2009. 3 Brülhart et al. (2015) report that among the 10 most fragmented OECD MAs, a MA includes 542 local governments on average. They surveyed 40 OECD and non-OECD countries, and show that on average, 10% of total national tax revenue is collected locally.
4 For example, in French MAs the land price of the most central parcels is roughly 85% higher than the price in the most peripheral areas (Combes et al., 2018) .
5 For instance, about half the workforces of London and Budapest spend more than 45 minutes commuting daily (OECD, 2015) .
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Little is known about how competing local governments (hereafter municipalities) handle these negative externalities typical of MAs. The purpose of this paper is to enhance our understanding of municipality public policy in the face of over-concentration of jobs in the central business district of a MA. We focus on trac congestion which, although probably the most important type of negative externality in the cities (Fujita, 1989, p. 258) , has received little attention from economists interested in local public policies. 6 ,7
This paper investigates (i) how trac congestion aects local public policies and, as a corollary, (ii) which local policy instruments are the most relevant to tackle trac congestion.
We develop an original spatial urban tax competition model which considers a MA consisting of a set of municipalities: a large city surrounded by numerous small towns. Residents and business capital are mobile across municipalities. Households and rms compete for land.
Households commute to work and incur commuting costs which include trac congestion costs. Competing municipalities have access to several local policy instruments:
1. A tax on mobile capital and a head tax on mobile residents. These taxes capture the important features of local residential and business taxation in many countries; they are the most studied taxes in the tax competition literature. 8 2. Two key instruments allow municipalities to inuence directly the number of workers in their jurisdictions, and consequently, the level of trac congestion incurred by their residents: (i) a labor tax/subsidy which is based on the workforce employed in the municipality; (ii) the provision of public goods which generate spillovers due to commuting.
The model allows households to consume local public goods not only as residents but also as workers. While there are some local public goods that benet only to local residents (e.g. local public schools), many are consumed also by local workers potentially commuting from other jurisdictions (e.g. safety, street cleaning and road conditions).
These public goods make municipalities more attractive as workplaces and thus increase local trac congestion.
6 In 2018, in the ten most congested European cities, the overall travel time was 41% higher than in a free ow situation which represented a 2% rise compared to 2017. This gure rose to 69% and 77% during the morning and the evening peaks respectively (TomTom, 2018) . This has not escaped the attention of policy makers, including Valérie Pécresse, President of the Paris Region who stated that the inhabitants of the Paris Region are obsessed with spending less time in trac jams (2/6/2019).
7 Most of our conclusions also apply to the other externalities mentioned above. Formal modeling of air pollution induced by commuting is very close to our proposed modeling of trac congestion (see e.g. Denant-Boèmont et al., 2018) . Besides, a previous version of this paper (Ly, 2018b) considers the case of negative agglomeration externalities from public good congestion induced by commuters and provides ndings in line with those in the present paper.
8 The model also includes a tax on immobile land whose role is to allow municipalities to balance their budget.
It is not the primary interest of the paper.
Introduction
The main results of the paper are summarized below.
1. If towns can retain part of their workers using labor subsidies, the decentralized equilibrium is Pareto-ecient. As intermediate outputs, the resulting original rst-best local policies are characterized: public good provision optimally internalizes residents' and commuters' preferences; residential taxes guarantee optimal access to business districts;
capital is not taxed.
This result highlights the key role of local labor subsidies in the regulation of trac congestion in MAs. However, in practice, this instrument is generally not available to municipalities for three main reasons. First, subsidies are often considered violations of competition rules. Therefore, legislation in the European Union, Canada, and Australia for example, heavily limits use of subsidies (OECD, 2010; Thomas, 2010) . 9 Second, subsidies are expensive. On the contrary, local labor taxation is often enacted as a budgetary tool to supplement other local revenue sources. For example, the introduction of payroll taxes in San Francisco in 1970 followed this logic (Sherwood-Call, 1986) . 10 Third, competition among local governments can lead to a subsidy race leading to rentseeking behavior by rms (Tannenwald, 2002) .
2. If towns are not allowed to subsidize labor, trac congestion in the city becomes exessive, and local governments respond by setting inecient second-best public policies: (i) the city over-taxes capital which leads to too little capital in the city; (ii) the city undertaxes residents which leads to too many residents in the city; (iii) in the presence of commuting-induced spillovers, local public goods are under-provided by the city and over-provided by the towns.
In sum, if towns cannot retain their workers through the use of subsidies, the central business district (CBD) attracts too many workers from the suburbs, leading to severe trac congestion in the city. The municipalities then use the other policy instruments to dampen this excessive congestion: the city limits the size and attractiveness of the 9 In several US states, local governments are allowed to provide rms with development subsidies such as tax breaks, low-cost loans, grants, infrastructure support and low-cost land (Warner and Zheng, 2013) .
Development subsidies dier from the at rate subsidies considered in this paper which are based on the municipality's total workforce. Development subsidies are bilateral commitments involving a local government and a rm. Since they are at the discretion of local politicians, they tend to favor big and highly visible projects at the expense of less visible ones (Elkin, 2015) . Moreover, since these subsidies are based on ex-ante agreements, once established in the municipality, the rm might not fulll its promises related to job creation or other performance criteria (Sullivan and Green, 1999) .
10 See Sjoquist and Stoycheva (2012) for an exhaustive list of the US states whose local governments use labor taxation. In France, labor was taxed by municipalities from 1975 to 1999 (Bouvier, 2004) . Peralta (2007) reports on cases in Australia, Austria, Greece, Korea and Mexico.
3 taxes, traffic jam and spillover CBD, while the towns make their secondary business districts (SBDs) more attractive.
This result highlights in particular, the detrimental role of commuting-induced spillovers which amplify the damage caused by trac congestion by spurring the municipalities to engage in inecient public good provision.
The paper updates our understanding of the governance of MAs in the context of typical negative externalities such as trac congestion, pollution and other disturbances due to the agglomeration of jobs in MA centers and household mobility. The analysis suggests that local governments may be using many of their policy instruments to help to tackle these externalities. However, national governments often fail to give local authorities an important role to address these externalities; most political solutions so far are either national e.g. road tolls and gasoline/green taxation (Pigou, 1912; Walters, 1961; Vickrey, 1963) or regional e.g. integrated public transport provision (Preston, 2012) . Further decentralization of the ght against MA negative externalities could be fruitful. Trac jams and CO2 emissions, for instance, can vary spatially to a signicant extent within a single MA. Thus, local governments which are better informed about voters' preferences and habits could be more exible and would be able to better target these externalities than national or regional governments. This echoes Oates's (1972) decentralization theorem.
The main policy recommendation to emerge from the analysis is that suburban towns should be allowed more leeway to retain their workers which might help to unclog MA roads and reduce externalities such as air pollution. Local labor subsidies which are usually missing in local policy instrument sets, could be an appropriate tool for this task. More generally, the paper suggests that addressing the externalities typical of MAs will require the development of truly polycentric MAs by encouraging the growth of strong secondary economic poles.
This recommendation is in line with Cavailhes et al. (2007) ; our paper stresses that local governments could play an important role in this reshaping of MAs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 presents the optimal public policy rules for a city and its surrounding towns with and without access to labor taxes/subsidies. Section 5 provides a numerical illustration. Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 concludes.
Related literature
This paper contributes to several literature streams. It is novel in proposing the inclusion of a spatial urban structure (e.g. Fujita, 1989) in the standard capital tax competition model developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) . Thus, it links the local public 4 2. Related literature economics (LPE) and the urban economics (UE) literatures. 11 ,12 The proposed model is also one of the rst to include both inter-jurisdictional residential mobility and commuting in a capital tax competition framework à la Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) . 13 It links capital tax competition models with residential mobility which exclude commuting (e.g. Wilson, 1995; Brueckner, 2000) to models that include commuting but ignore residents' mobility across jurisdictions (e.g. Braid, 1996 Braid, , 2000 Peralta, 2007) . Finally, our study of local government responses to trac congestion links the LPE literature and the transport economics literature (e.g. Parry, 2002; Rouwendal and Verhoef, 2006) which tends to consider trac congestion from a national/regional government perspective.
Recent work on LPE reveals a trend towards inclusion of more real-life features of MAs in the tax competition model à la Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) . First, following Braid (2000), some papers (e.g. Peralta, 2007; Legras, 2019) include costly commuting in the tax competition model. 14 Commuting costs are purely distance costs and do not include trac congestion; commuters do not inict externalities on one another. Second, eorts have been devoted to include a core-periphery structure in tax competition models (Janeba and Osterloh, 2013; Gaigné et al., 2016) , accounting for the fact that MAs are typically composed of a central city surrounded by suburban towns. Trac congestion stands at the crossroads of these two approaches: it involves commuting costs typically incurred by suburbanites commuting to the MA center.
This paper allows commuters to consume local public goods at their workplace. 15 Since Gordon (1983) , the standard way to model local public good spillovers is to assume that public goods provided in a jurisdiction benet indiscriminately all residents from neighboring jurisdictions (e.g. Wellisch, 1993) . In practice, commuters benet more than non-commuters 11 The LPE literature might be viewed by some to be a strand of the UE literature. However, these two bodies of work are complementary. While LPE models consider endogenous local governments and generally ignore the spatial dimension of MAs, UE models consider local government choices as exogenous but pay particular attention to the spatial features of MAs.
12 Gaigné et al. (2016) proposes a tax competition model with a spatial urban structure. Our model is closer to the standard tax competition models in that it includes endogenous public good provision and taxable mobile capital which are probably the most prevalent features in the tax competition literature. 14 Since Braid (1996) , costless commuting is more common in tax competition models. See e.g. Kächelein (2014), Sas (2017) and Ly (2018a) .
15 In most models with commuting (e.g. Braid, 1996 Braid, , 2000 Ly, 2018a) , residents and workers are disconnected so that commuters are reduced purely to production factors which by nature, neither consume public goods nor pay taxes. In an extension of their analysis, Gaigné et al. (2016) consider suburban commuters' consumption of public goods in the city, but public good provision is xed exogenously. 5 taxes, traffic jam and spillover from neighboring jurisdictions' public goods. Our modeling of spillovers induced by commuting reects this. Moreover, workers' consumption of public goods also reduces the traditional divide between public goods consumed by households and public inputs which benet rms as is the focus in Matsumoto (1998 Matsumoto ( , 2000 .
The model
This section presents the model used for the analysis. Subsection 3.1 describes the model basic economic and spatial structure and introduces trac congestion, the central externality in this paper. Subsection 3.2 describes households' behavior and introduces the commuting spillover externality. Subsection 3.3 describes how rms choose their inputs and compete with households for land. Subsection 3.4 derives the location system which characterizes the distribution of capital, residents and workers in the MA resulting from subsections 3.1 to 3.3.
Metropolitan structure and commuting costs
The economy consists of a MA composed of n + 1 municipalities: one central city c and n symmetric suburban towns s i with i = 1, . . . , n. Residents, workers and business capital are mobile across municipalities. City and towns dier in two respects.
First, the MA is endowed with a hub-and-spoke commuting transportation network (Gaigné et al., 2016) which means that the n towns s i are connected only to the city c, while the city has direct access to all of the towns in the MA. Therefore, having chosen a residence location, an individual living in town s i can work in her home town s i or in the city c. All residents living in c work in c. This MA structure is aimed at capturing the fact that suburbanites usually hesitate between working in the city or in their home town. Commuting from the city to the suburb or from one suburban town to another similar suburban town is less frequent.
Second, city and towns dier in size as specied in the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Size).
(i) The city is suciently large to directly inuence all the town variables.
(ii) The towns are atomistic; they cannot inuence the variables in other municipalities.
Assumption 1 is in line with patterns observed in most MAs which are characterized by strong size asymmetry between city and towns as documented in Brülhart et al. (2015) . 16 The paper adopts the following notations, for each municipality j, j ∈ {c; s i }:
16 Brülhart et al. (2015) report that Paris, Hamburg, Vienna and New York for example, have respectively 268, 229, 199 and 179 times more population than the average populations of the municipalities in their MAs. 
Fixed MA capital stock captures the fact that large cities often have market power in the capital market. 18 The results do not change with any xed number m > 1 of symmetric MAs linked by capital and residential mobility sharing a xed capital stock. Recalling that a proportion of the residents of s i work in c whereas none of the residents of c work in s i , we have:
Each individual is assumed to consume a single unit of land, so that local land market clearing for each municipality j ∈ {c; s i } requires:
The numbers of residents and workers may not coincide within a municipality but they do coincide at the level of the MA since each individual chooses a workplace within the MA. The population and workforce resource constraints are:
17 For ease of reference, the key equilibrium conditions are numbered (e.1), (e.2), etc..
18
The sources of this market power are various. While in practice not all capital in a MA or region is xed, a non negligible share of the savings of the MA citizens is channeled to regional banks which invest primarily in regional rms (Janeba and Osterloh, 2013) . In addition, some cities such as New-York, Paris and Singapore are international nancial centers and concentrate a signicant share of the global capital stock. 7 taxes, traffic jam and spillover
Jobs are concentrated in the CBD of the MA, as postulated in:
Assumption 2 (Concentration). Assume that the city employs at least one-third of the MA workers:
which is equivalent to W c > n i=1 W s i /2 and at equilibrium W c /n > W s i /2 since the towns are symmetric.
Assumption 2 is theoretically relevant for studying trac congestion and is probably the most common case in practice. 19 ,20 Subsection 6.2 discusses our results if this assumption does not hold.
City's residents-workers
Town's commuters SBD Town's residents-workers For convenience, the spatial structure of the MA is depcited in Figure 1 . The MA is composed of n strips of 1 space unit width and L c /n + L s space unit length. Thus, the total area of the MA is L c + nL s that is, the sum of the land endowments of the city and the n towns. Each strip is an interval [−L c /n, L s ] which links the center of the city, −L c /n, to the 19 For instance, in 2016, among the 100 most populated French MAs, the central city accounted for 51% of the MA's workforce on average; 87% of cities accounted for more than a third of their MA workforces. Source:
data collected from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies.
20 Gaigné et al. (2016) make a related assumption. They assume that more than a third of the MA's population is concentrated in the city. Our assumption is less demanding since central cities usually employ a higher number of workers than their number of residents.
8 3. The model extremity of one of the n towns, L s . The city is represented spatially by the union of the n intervals [−L c /n, 0]. Each of these intervals is divided between business land [−L c /n, −A]
and residential land [−A, 0]. Since each household consumes one unit of land, we have: 21
The CBD is the union of the intervals [−L c /n, −A]. It represents the business land used by rms located in the city whose total area is L c = L c − R c .
Each town is represented spatially by the interval ]0, L s ]. For each town s i , this interval is divided into four subintervals:
is occupied by the residents of s i who commute to the CBD.
Using (1) and (2), the following explicit expressions for B i , C i and D i result:
Next, we introduce commuting costs. An individual who lives at location l and works at location l incurs commuting cost: 23 21 Notice that A does not depend on i which means that the amount of business land used by rms is the same on each strip of the MA. This is because the rms in the SBD pay the same land rent per business land unit regardless of which strip they are located on (see subsection 3.3).
22 At equlibrium, there are only two possible locations for the SBD: (i) central to the distribution of the town's residents-workers; (ii) at the extremity of the town. We assume that the former case holds, e.g. for historical reasons. Gaigné et al. (2016) argue that a central location would be the optimal choice for the municipalities.
Our results would be qualitatively similar with SBDs at the extremity of towns.
23 This modeling of commuting costs with trac congestion is in line with Fujita (1989) . For tractability, we assume that c(l) is linear, and that the marginal congestion costs are same in the city and in the suburbs. The linerarity of our trac congestion function is consistent with structural models of trac congestion (Arnott et al., 1993) . All the results derived in the paper can easily be generalized to any non-linear function of the form:
for any dierentiable function T (·) and scalars a and b. 9 taxes, traffic jam and spillover
where W + l is the residence location of the individual working at l living the farthest from l . c(l) is the marginal transportation cost at location l. Parameter a > 0 (resp. t > 0) captures trac congestion costs (resp. distance costs), as explained below. We assume that workers incur no commuting costs within business districts: for example, an individual working in the CBD pays only for commuting from her residence location to the boundary of the CBD, −A. 24
To understand commuting costs (7), consider an individual working in the CBD, that is at location l = −A, and living at location l ∈] − A, B i ] on one of the strips depicted in Figure 1 .
The individual's commuting costs (7) can be written as:
The rst part of (8), t(l + A), is the traditional distance commuting costs considered in the literature (e.g. Braid, 2000; Peralta, 2007; Gaigné et al., 2016) . Parameter t is the cost per unit of distance. 25 These costs (fuel, transport tickets, etc.) would be incurred by the commuter even were she the only individual on the road.
The second part of (8), a l −A (B i − z)dz, is the continuous sum of the trac congestion costs that this individual incurs during the journey to work. At each location l 0 , this commuter is on the road with B i − l 0 other commuters and pays the trac congestion cost a(B i − l 0 ).
Denition 1 (Trac jam). Parameter a > 0 is trac jam intensity. It measures the marginal trac congestion cost induced by an additional commuter.
The key parameter a can be interpreted as the inverse of the transportation supply at each location l. Denition 1 highlights the rst key externality in this paper. Trac congestion is not novel in the UE literature (see e.g. Fujita, 1989) ; however, to our knowledge, there are no studies of such externalities in a context of competition among sub-central governments.
The study of trac congestion in a tax competition context is allowed by the spatial urban structure introduced in this model and by the identication of commuters as residents.
10 3. The model
Households
All households are identical and composed of a single individual. An individual living at location l in municipality j ∈ {c; s i } and working at l in j ∈ {c; s i } consumes x jj units of a private numeraire good, and one unit of land paying land rent ρ i (l), supplies inelastically one unit of labor in j receiving wage w j , pays the commuting costs T (l, l ) and the local residential head tax τ R j .
Each household is endowed with k ≡ K/P units of capital and j ≡ L j /P units of each municipality j's land: the MA's capital endowment K and each municipality j's land endowment L j are evenly distributed among all the households in the MA. Since k is invested in the municipality providing the highest return, the equilibrium capital return r is identical in all municipalities. The landowner of j supplies it to the household or the rm making the highest bid and pays the land tax τ L j j to municipality j. 26 The budget constraint of a household who lives at location l in municipality j and works at location l in municipality j is:
where Γ is the individual land income net of land taxation, whose explicit form can be found in Appendix A. This individual's utility is:
where G j is the local public good provided by government j. The utility derived from public good consumption is increasing and concave, that is U j G , U jj G > 0 and U j GG , U jj GG < 0, where the subscripts denote derivatives.
Denition 2 (Commuting spillovers). Function U jj measures benets earned by workers from local public services and amenities (safety, road conditions, etc.) provided at their workplace.
Function U jj captures utility spillovers in local public good consumption induced by commuting. Local authorities can make their municipality more attractive to workers by improving these services and amenities. 27 Typically, a resident of town s i who considers commuting to the city compares the sub-utilities of working in her home town, x s i s i +U s i s i (G s i ), and working in the city, x s i c + U s i c (G c ). Her decision depends not only on private consumption x jj but also on public good provision both in the city and in her residence town, captured by U jj .
26 The competition for land between households and rms is in line with that introduced in Ly (2018a).
27 Local public goods limited to residents (e.g. local public schools) are not considered in the paper. Generalizing the paper results to such goods is straightforward. 11 taxes, traffic jam and spillover Denition 2 highlights the second key externality of this paper. To our knowledge, this model is the rst to investigate local public good provision in the presence of commuting spillovers. This is enabled by the fact that each commuter is identied as a resident whereas in previous tax competition models commuters are pure private inputs, thus U jj = 0 (e.g. Braid, 1996 Braid, , 2000 Peralta, 2007; Kächelein, 2014; Ly, 2018a) .
The indirect utility of a household residing in j at location l and working in j at location l is:
where x jj has been substituted in (10) using (9). Residential mobility implies that every resident in the MA obtains the same level of utility u at equilibrium. Equating the indirect utility function (11) with the prevailing utility level u, and solving for ρ i (l) allows us to determine the residential bid land rent:
is the maximum rent that a household working in j is willing to pay to live at location l.
The marginal resident of town s i who is indierent between working in the CBD and working in the SBD of s i resides at location l = B i which is characterized by:
Firms
In municipality j ∈ {c; s i }, the private good is produced combining labor W j , capital K j and business land L j according to the production function F j ≡ F j (W j , K j , L j ) which represents all local rms in municipality j. F j exhibits constant returns to scale and satises F j X > 0, F j XX < 0 and F j XY > 0 for all X, Y ∈ {K j ; W j ; L j }, which means that F j exhibits positive but decreasing marginal returns with respect to each factor, and that factors are technological complements. 28 The prot of the rms in municipality j is:
28 Our main results hold whenever F j is homogeneous whatever its degree of homogeneity. Increasing returns to scale often interpreted as agglomeration economies (Burbidge and Cu, 2005) were included in a preliminary version of this model (see Ly, 2018b) . However, constant returns to scale do not rule out agglomeration economies. They can be included by assuming that factors are more productive in the city than in towns, that is ∀ (W, K, L), F c (W, K, L) > F s (W, K, L), as assumed in the numerical example of section 5.
12 3. The model where w j is the wage prevailing in municipality j, r is the MA return to capital, ρ L j is the municipal business land rent, τ W j is the tax rate on labor levied by municipality j, 29 and τ K j is its capital tax rate. For each municipality j ∈ {c; s i }, optimal demand for labor W j and capital K j maximize Π j and are characterized by:
where F j 's subscripts stand for derivatives. Firms make no prot at equilibrium, so that for each municipality j ∈ {c; s i }, Π j = 0. Solving the zero-prot condition for ρ L j determines the business bid land rent:
which is obtained by inserting (15), (16) and Euler's identity
The bid land rent ψ L j is the maximum rent that rms are ready to pay for land L j . Firms compete with households for land which implies that in each municipality, the business bid land rent is equal to the residential bid land rent oered by the resident who lives the closest to the business district:
Eliminating ψ i (l), l ∈ {−A; C i ; D i } using (12) and ψ L j using (17) from (18), for each munici-
recalling that the individual residing at locations −A, C and D pay no commuting costs. Condition (19) characterizes the distribution of land between residents and rms in municipality j.
Location system
The previous subsections described the behavior of individual households and rms. At the metropolitan level, these decentralized behaviors entail a specic distribution of capital, residents and workers among municipalities. This subsection characterizes this distribution by deriving the so-called location system which is of particular importance to local governments.
29 Notice that assuming alternatively that τ W j is paid directly by workers would lead to strictly identical results.
However, it is simpler from a modeling viewpoint, to introduce τ W j in rms' prot.
30 Suppose for instance that rms in town si bid more than residents at l = Ci, so that ψ L s i > ψi (Ci). In this case, some owners of residential land decide to supply their land to rms, business land increases in si and rms bid less for land (since F s i LL < 0) until ψ L s i = ψi (Ci).
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Since the return to capital r is the same throughout the MA, r can be eliminated from the condition for capital input demand (16) so that:
Conditions (e.1) and (e.4) characterize the distribution of capital {K c ; K s 1 ; . . . ; K sn } in the MA. Similarly, the same utility level u prevails throughout the MA, so that u can be eliminated from the marginal renter condition (19):
where the denition of Λ jj and the optimal condition for labor and land input demand, (15) and (17) 
using the expression for the indirect utility (11) and replacing the wages from the optimal condition for labor input demand (15) 
As will be seen in the next section, the location pattern characterized by system (e.1)(e.6) is the main driving force behind municipality's policies.
Decentralized policies
Pareto eciency is characterized in the online appendix . In this section, we characterize decentralized local public policies chosen by municipalities when local labor taxation/subsidy is allowed (subsection 4.1) and when it is proscribed (subsection 4.2). Since all towns s i are identical, we drop index i in the remainder of the paper.
Optimal local public policies with labor taxes/subsidies: First-best
This subsection considers the case where local labor taxes/subsidies τ W j , j ∈ {c; s} are available so that each local government j ∈ {c; s} nances its local public good provision G j by levying a head tax on its residents τ R j , a unit tax on capital τ K j , a unit tax on labor τ W j and a unit 14 4. Decentralized policies tax on land property τ L j . Local government j's budget constraint is:
and G j , and adjusts the land tax τ L j to clear its local budget constraint (20). 32 Local government j maximizes the utility of its residents. Residential mobility in j implies that all residents of j have the same equilibrium utility level. Then, government j's objective is reduced to maximizing the utility of a representative resident, say the resident living the closest to municipality j's business district that is, at l = −A for the city and at l = C or l = D for a town.
When making its policy choices, government j considers as given the choices of the other governments. Additionally, government j does not directly control for the location of capital, residents and workers, but it rationally takes into account their location responses to its policies. Due to their size dierence (Assumption 1) city and towns do not account for the same set of location responses.
Since town s is atomistic , it regards its decisions as having no eect on the variables in the city and the other towns. It accounts for the fact that its population R s , workforce W s and capital K s are dened implicitly as functions of its policy instruments {τ R s ; τ K s ; τ W s ; G s } by the location system (e.4), (e.5) and (e.6). Therefore, government s's problem is to maximize V ss (C), choosing τ R s , τ K s , τ W s and G s , and subject to the location system (e.4)(e.6). Unlike the towns, the size of the city is signicant; the city accounts for the responses of all economic agents in the MA to its policy decisions. It accounts for the fact that the city's and the towns' population (R c and R s ), workforce (W c and W s ) and capital (K c and K s ) are dened implicitly as functions of its policy instruments {τ R c ; τ K c ; τ W c ; G c } by the location system (e.1) (e.6). Government c's problem therefore, is to maximize V cc (−A), choosing τ R c , τ K c , τ W c and G c , subject to the full location system (e.1)(e.6).
Solving the municipalities' maximization problems, the following result can be derived:
Result 1. The optimal public policy rules followed by the benevolent local government of municipality j ∈ {c; s} when nancing its public good provision G j using the tax instrument 31 For simplicity, we consider nonrival public goods, while most empirical studies nd evidence of rivalry (e.g. Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973) . See Ly (2018b) for a version of the model with this rival public goods; the results are in line with those in this paper.
32 Formally, τ L j is eliminated from the net land income Γ using (20) in the remainder of the paper (see Appendix A.2). Note that whatever the other instrument (i.e. τ R j , τ K j , τ W j or Gj) the modeler chooses to account for budget constraint (20), the results would be unchanged: τ L j would still be used indirectly as the budgetclearing instrument by municipalities since Lj is x, contrary to Rj, Kj, Wj. 15 taxes, traffic jam and spillover
where τ L j , j ∈ {c; s} allows to clear the budget constraint (20) . And:
whose positive sign stems from Assumption 2.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Result 1 implies that:
and R c , K c and W c are dened by the constraints (e.1)(e.3).
Proof. See the online appendix .
Corollary 1 reveals that municipalities choose their policy instruments in accordance with a central planner's eciency rules. 33 Competing local governments which can nance local 33 Conditions (24a), (24b) and (26) Labor taxation. Conditions (21a) and (21b) characterize the setting of local labor taxes.
Condition (21a) indicates that town s uses its labor tax as a subsidy. The rationale behind this central result is as follows. Given the population R s , an additional worker in the SBD of s is a resident of s who initially was commuting to the CBD. This can be depicted as a one unit shift of point B i towards 0 in Figure 1 . Then, the total trac congestion cost decreases by 0.5a(W c /n) 2 in the city, and increases by 0.5a(W s /2) 2 in a town. Assumption 2, implies that due to the high concentration of workers in the CBD (W c /n > W s /2), the additional worker in the SBD of s reduces the net trac congestion cost incurred by the residents of s. This gain is internalized by government s by a labor subsidy as stated in (21a).
Intuitively, condition (21a) means that since trac congestion is higher in the city than in the suburbs, the town governments subsidize their workers to prevent to many from commuting to the CBD. Importantly, if there were no trac congestion (a = 0), towns would have no incentive to use the labor subsidy (i.e. τ W s = 0, since Φ = 0). Trac congestion requires that the towns' tax instrument sets include local labor taxes to achieve a Pareto ecient allocation of labor in the MA.
According to condition (21b), the city does not use its labor tax. This indicates that the eorts made by the self-interested atomistic towns to retain their workers are sucient to ensure an optimal level of trac congestion in the city.
Residential taxation. Conditions (22a) and (22b) characterize the residential taxation rules. Condition (22b) indicates that the scal benet τ R c of a new resident in c covers the additional cost of commuting to the CBD induced by this new resident: tW c /n + a(W c /n) 2 .
By crowding out one unit of business land (shift of −A towards L c /n in Figure 1 ), the new resident increases the overall distance to the CBD by W c /n. 34 This implies an additional commuting cost of tW c /n due to distance and a(W c /n) 2 due to trac congestion.
Intuitively, a new resident in c makes the CBD less accessible by increasing the cost of commuting to work in c. In order to safeguard an optimal level of access to the CBD, local government c uses its residential tax τ R c to control its population size. 35 characterized in the online appendix . The economic interpretations of conditions (26)(31) can be found in the online appendix .
34 Each of the Wc/n CBD workers located on the strip on which the new resident settles incurs one more space unit of commuting.
35 Notice that if commuting is not costly that is t = a = 0, local governments do not use their tax on residents.
In this case, local authorities know that workers are perfectly mobile so that a jurisdiction's population and workforce are not connected directly. τ R cannot be used to control access to the business district. 17 taxes, traffic jam and spillover Like condition (22b), condition (22a) indicates that the residential tax τ R s internalizes the additional congestion cost induced by a new resident: tW s /2 + a(W s /2) 2 . Indeed, a new resident living and working in s crowds out one unit of business land and increases the commuting distance to the SBD of s by W s /2 space units which generates the additional commuting costs mentioned above. 36 ,37 Compared to the city, an additional cost is internalized by the residential tax in town s. This cost is the subsidy −τ W s = Φ oered to the new residentworker settling in s, according to condition (21a).
Capital taxation. Conditions (23a) and (23b) which characterize the capital taxation rules, state, as standard, that municipalities have no incentive to tax capital. Capital entails no externality to be internalized.
Public good provision. Conditions (24a) and (24b) characterize the public good provision rules. They are Samuelson eciency rules extended to an economy in which mobile workers also benet from local public goods. They state that municipality j ∈ {c; s} chooses its public good provision G j so as to equalize the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for its public good to the marginal cost of providing the public good, C j G .
Condition (24a) indicates that town s accounts for the satisfaction of all its residents R s U s G and especially its residents-workers W s U ss G . Interestingly, condition (24b) reveals that the city not only accounts for the benets of its own residents R c (U c G + U cc G ) but also internalizes the public good spillovers induced by workers' mobility from the suburb to the city nW sc U sc G . 38
The main result of this subsection can be summarized in the following proposition: Proposition 1. If local labor taxation/subsidy is allowed, a decentralized equilibrium leads to Pareto-eciency, and:
(i) towns subsidize labor to internalize the trac jam cost dierential with the city.
(ii) residential taxation guarantees optimal access to business districts.
(iii) capital taxation is not used.
(iv) public good provision follows the Samuelson rule extended to commuting spillover. 36 We assume in this interpretation that the new resident works in the SBD. We could also transform (22a) using (e.6) to describe the case of a new resident commuting to the CBD. The resulting condition is less easy to interpret even if the same forces are at stake. 37 Contrary to τ R j , τ W j does not internalize the commuting cost due to distance tW + j , where W + j is as dened in (7). The reason for this is that given the number of workers, new residents increase the overall commuting distance in j by crowding out business land. However, given the number of residents, new workers do not aect the overall commuting distance in j.
Decentralized policies
Proposition 1 presents an original picture of local government behavior compared to the LPE literature which is further discussed in section 6.
Optimal local public policies absent labor taxes/subsidies
The above analysis assumes that the local tax instrument set includes labor taxation/subsidy. Therefore, towns are able to internalize trac congestion by using labor subsidies as a Pigouvian policy instrument. However, in OECD countries labor subsidies are rarely available at the local level (section 1). We now consider the more common case where municipalities have no access to local labor taxes/subsidies. Solving the same municipality maximization problems as in subsection 4.1, with τ W j = 0, the following result can be derived:
Result 2. The optimal public policy rules followed by the benevolent local government of municipality j ∈ {c; s} when nancing its public good provision G j using the tax instrument
and τ L j clears the budget constraint (20) with τ W j = 0. The distortion terms are dened as: 39
where Φ is dened in (25) and Φ > 0 under Assumption 2, and:
Proof. See Appendix C.
Result 2 implies that:
39 The signs are obtained recalling that Φ ≥ 0, FXX < 0 and FXY > 0 for all X, Y ∈ {K; W ; L}. 
Comparing Corollary 2 to the Pareto-ecient outcome of Corollary 1 shows that municipality behaviors are distorted in a sub-ecient way, as shown by the distortion terms d x j , j = {c; s} and x ∈ {R; K; G}. 40 The only cause of these distortions is the impossibility for towns to regulate trac congestion using labor subsidies. 41 Since towns cannot subsidize workers, there are too many workers in the city and too few in the suburbs. This labor misallocation can be seen in the presence of Φ > 0 in condition (39) which was absent from eciency condition (31). Then, town (resp. city) authorities distort their remaining instruments {τ R j ; τ K j ; G j } to be more (resp. less) attractive to workers.
Residential taxation. Condition (32a) depicts how town s distorts its tax on residents to overcome the absence of labor tax. The sign of the distortion d R s is ambiguous. To understand this, consider two polar cases.
First, suppose that t > 0, a > 0 and F s W L ≈ 0. Then, d R s < 0 that is, the towns under-tax their residents compared to (22a). Imperfect worker mobility (i.e. costly commuting) spurs the towns to set a low residential tax to attract residents-workers and hence alleviate the trac congestion incurred by their residents working in the CBD.
Second, suppose that t ≈ 0, a ≈ 0 and F s W L > 0. Then, d R s > 0 that is, the towns overtax their residents. Local authorities know that population and workforce are not linked by imperfect worker mobility since commuting is not costly. However, they can attract workers by increasing the amount of land available to rms. Indeed, technological complementarity 40 See Figure OA .1 in the online appendix for an illustration of the misallocation implied by conditions (34a), (27), indicates that given the towns' residential tax rate, the city chooses an ineciently low residential tax rate, since −d R c < 0.
This too low residential tax is a response to the excessive number of workers inducing trac congestion in the city (condition (39)). The city cuts its residential tax to attract new residents, which limits the land size of the CBD and thus avoids some commuting ows.
However, this attractive city residential tax policy entails a misallocation of residents in the MA. Condition (37) shows that the number of residents in the city (resp. towns) is ineciently high (resp. low) compared to the Pareto-ecient condition (29) Public good provision. Condition (34a) shows that, since the towns cannot subsidize labor, the towns over-provide public goods compared to the ecient extended Samuelson rule (24a), since −d G s < 0. By increasing their public good provision, the towns are able to encourage more workers to work in their SBD, since U ss G > 0.
Condition (34b) indicates that the city behaves in an opposite way by providing an ineciently low amount of public good, since d G c > 0. Since towns cannot keep a sucient number of workers, the city controls trac congestion by decreasing its public good supply which discourages some suburbanites from commuting to the CBD, since U sc G > 0.
The distortions in the local policy setting caused by the existence of trac jams in the MA are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If towns are not allowed to subsidize workers, a decentralized equilibrium does not lead to Pareto-eciency, and under Assumption 2:
(i) the city under-taxes residents compared to the towns.
(ii) the city over-taxes capital compared to the towns.
(iii) the city (resp. towns) under-provides (resp. over-provide) local public goods.
Proposition 2, which shows the eects of trac congestion on local public policy in a MA, is novel in the literature. The main new insight is the following. If the city concentrates an important share of the workforce of the MA (Assumption 2), the impossibility for towns to retain workers by employing subsidies entails an overow of workers in the CBD. To prevent excess trac congestion incurred by households working in the CBD, city and towns engage in inecient policies. Notably, part (iii) indicates that local governments distort their public good provision accounting for local public good spillovers induced by commuting. The city (resp. towns) reduces (resp. increase) its (resp. their) public good provision to be less (resp. more) attractive to workers. To our knowledge, our model is the rst to consider commuting spillovers and to depict how they can induce distortion in local governments' choices.
We have seen also that the distortions in the local policy setting induced by the excessive level of trac congestion in the city relative to the towns (i.e. too many workers in the city) lead to a misallocation of residents and capital in the MA. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If towns are not allowed to subsidize workers, under Assumption 2, a decentralized equilibrium leads to:
(i) an ineciently high number of workers in the city, compared to the towns.
(ii) an ineciently high number of residents in the city, compared to the towns. 22 5. Numerical example (iii) an ineciently low amount of capital in the city, compared to the towns.
Numerical example
To gain general equilibrium insights into the results of section 4, this section provides a numerical illustration. The purpose is to shed a light on the distortions caused by various trac jam intensities a. To this end, we assume that the cost function of public good provision is C j (G) = G 2 , that the utility function is x j + U j (G j ) + U jj (G j ) = x j + G γ j + G j and that the production is carried out by the Cobb- Finally, public good spillovers due to commuting allow municipalities to directly aect the workers ow. According to Figure 2c , to reduce its attractiveness to workers the city provides an ineciently low amount of public good (∆G c < 0). However, Figure 2d shows that since towns want to retain their workers, they do the opposite and over-provide public goods (∆G s > 0).
Discussion
The model developed in this paper sheds new light on several important and often longstanding LPE debates. This section discusses some of them. Subsection 6.1 highlights the original role played by residential taxation in MAs. Subsection 6.2 questions the standard result that cities charge higher tax rates than towns. Subsection 6.3 discusses how household mobility calls for a reconsideration of externalities at the local level. Subsection 6.4 outlines that labor taxation should not be regarded as a second-class policy in MAs.
45 For space reasons, we do not report the graphs for ∆Ks = −∆Kc/n, ∆Rs = −∆Rc/n and ∆Ws = −∆Wc/n which are symmetric to ∆Kc, ∆Rc and ∆Wc with respect to the x-axis. 24 6. Discussion 6.1. A new role for the residential tax: job accessibility The paper sheds new light on the role of local residential taxes. In the literature, the essential motive for taxing mobile residents is to internalize crowding costs induced by their consumption of a rival local public good. This role has been conrmed for most types of residence based taxes such as head taxes (Wildasin, 1980 (Wildasin, , 1986 , housing taxes (Hoyt, 1991; Krelove, 1993) and wage taxes (Wilson, 1995) . 46 In all these cases, without crowding costs, local governments do not tax their residents if they can nance public goods via another undistortive tax instrument.
In this paper, despite the nonrivalry of local public goods and the availability of an undistortive tax on land, municipalities use residential taxes even without trac congestion to control access to their business district: 47 they raise their residential tax to discourage too many residents-workers from choosing their business district as a workplace. To our knowledge, the link between residential taxes and job accessibility has not previously been demonstrated.
6.2. Who sets the highest tax rate in the MA?
The paper also provides new insights into the longstanding question about which, city or towns, sets the highest taxes on capital and residents in a MA? The traditional tax competition literature is unambiguous: the city charges higher tax rates than the towns on both capital (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991; Bucovetsky, 2009 ) and residents (Epple and Zelenitz, 1981; Hoyt, 1992) . 48 The basic reason for this is that due to its larger population, a city has more inuence on capital and housing prices than towns do, and therefore, can set higher tax rates on capital and housing.
These results have been conrmed by several theoretical contributions, especially for capital taxation. According to the new economic geography literature (e.g. Baldwin and Krugman, 2004) , agglomeration economies lock mobile capital into the largest jurisdictions which benet from this agglomeration rent and can levy a high capital tax rate on this quasi-xed tax base. 49 In a two-jurisdiction tax competition model with commuting, Kächelein (2014) shows that due to the limited geographic mobility of labor, the more populated jurisdiction sets a higher capital tax rate. Gaigné et al. (2016, p.108 ) nd that the central city sets a higher 46 The distortions arising when a residence-based tax is not available and local public goods are rivals are studied in Wellisch and Hulshorst (2000) .
47 Formally, this can be seen by assuming that a = 0 and t > 0 in (22a) and (22b).
48 See Wilson (1999) and Brülhart et al. (2015) for surveys of the literature on asymmetric tax competition.
49 Empirical evidence of the existence of taxable agglomeration rents is less clear. While Charlot and Paty (2007) for example provide results supporting this nding for French municipalities, Luthi and Schmidheiny (2013) using panel data of Swiss municipalities nd no evidence of a positive impact of agglomeration forces on capital tax rates. 25 taxes, traffic jam and spillover business tax rate than suburban municipalities, due to the central position of the CBD in the transportation network (see subsection 6.4 below). 50 Yet, the theoretical consensus stating that cities tax more heavily than towns does not always coincide with basic empirical facts. For instance, in 2009 among the ten most populated French MAs, 54% of suburban towns set a higher tax rate on capital than the rate set by the city in their MA, and 41% of towns set a higher housing tax rate (Ly, 2018b) . 51
This paper provides some insights which help to explain these observations. The model shows that whether the city or the towns set higher tax rates on capital and residents depends on the concentration of workers in the city. 52 If the city concentrates a low share of the MA workforce, the city sets lower tax rates than the towns on both capital and residents. In other words, in MAs where jobs are not overly concentrated in the city, we should observe a more signicant number of towns setting higher taxes on capital and residents than the city. The intuition is as follows. If the towns accounts for a high share of the workforce, then (i) the city taxes its capital less than the towns to reduce trac congestion in the suburbs, and (ii) the city taxes its residents less than the towns to guarantee a sucient level of access to jobs in SBDs.
Externalities and household mobility
Frequently, inter-jurisdictional externalities are considered as the main source of ineciencies in a context of decentralized government activities. A local government, by accounting exclusively for the welfare of its own residents, ignores the benets/costs of its policy choices for non-residents, and thus implements inecient policies. This conclusion is based on the assumption of immobile residents which is not satisfactory in the case of sub-metropolitan jurisdictions such as municipalities. Residents' inter-jurisdictional mobility forces local governments to account for the welfare of non-residents such that at the local level, inter-jurisdictional externalities are minor. Our paper reveals that an important source of ineciencies in MAs is the inter-individual externality of trac congestion. This involves distortions which can 50 A notable exception is Janeba and Osterloh (2013) where cities compete not only with the towns of their MA but also with cities in other MAs, while towns compete only with the municipalities in their particular MA. When the number of MAs is suciently large, the competition faced by a city is so high compared to that faced by the towns in its MA that the city sets a lower capital tax rate than that set by the towns.
51 These mitigated results are noted by Brülhart et al. (2015, p. , so that sign(τ R c − τ R s ) = sign(Wc/n − Ws/2) = sign(Wc − P/3). From condition (36), we directly have sign(τ K c − τ K s ) = sign(Wc − P/3). 26 6. Discussion work in the opposite direction to distortions induced by inter-jurisdictional externalities. This applies particularly to two types of externality.
The rst is the scal externality induced by capital mobility. The standard tax competition result is that capital inter-jurisdictional mobility spurs local governments to set ineciently low taxes on capital (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986) . This ineciency is due to a positive inter-jurisdictional externality: jurisdictions overlook the fact that increasing their own taxes will benet other jurisdictions receiving capital inows (Wildasin, 1989) . Residential mobility eliminates this externality since tax competition does not matter in the case of household mobility, since each region considers the welfare of nonresidents by taking the migration equilibrium into account (Wellisch, 2006, p. 115) . The present paper newly shows that the distortion threat in a MA with capital and household mobility is over-taxation of capital by the city which is aimed at preventing excessive trac congestion in the CBD.
The second externality is the public good spillover or its consumption by non-residents. A well-known result is that these spillover eects drive jurisdictions to under-provide local public goods, since in decentralized decision-making, the value of local public services to nonresidents is ignored (Gordon, 1983, p. 578) . This result also relies on the assumption of immobile residents. As shown in Wellisch (1993) , relaxing this assumption leads to ecient local public good provision, since local governments consider the welfare of mobile non-residents. Our analysis shows that despite residents' mobility, local public good spillovers lead local governments to distort their public good provision in order to prevent excessive trac congestion.
However, under-provision occurs only in the city; towns over-provide public goods.
Local labor tax/subsidy: a rst-class policy instrument
This paper shows that labor taxation/subsidy is a rst-best tax instrument. However, most work on tax competition with commuting and source-based taxation on labor considers it, a second-best instrument. In this literature, two main reasons explain why local governments make use of a labor tax/subsidy.
First, a labor tax might be imposed for budgetary reasons in the unavailability of any other tax relying on a less mobile tax base. This requires that labor mobility is limited, usually by commuting costs. 53 For example, in a model with symmetric jurisdictions, Braid (2000) shows that if local public goods are nanced by a labor tax and a capital tax, only the former is imposed in the presence of commuting costs. 54 In a model with a city and towns, Gaigné et al. 53 An exception is Braid (1996) in which labor limited mobility results from the xity of business land.
54 If commuting costs decrease the labor tax also decreases, until commuting costs reach zero when labor is no longer taxed and no public goods are provided. See proposition 3 and 4 in Braid (2000) .
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taxes, traffic jam and spillover (2016) nd a related result which shows that the city exploits labor limited mobility induced by commuting costs to impose a positive business tax, while towns set a zero tax. 55 The link between labor taxation and commuting costs is however broken if a less distortive tax allows the nancing of the public good. 56 Second, a labor tax/subsidy can be used also for tax exporting purposes that is, shifting the tax burden to nonresidents. This case is illustrated in Peralta (2007) which shows that the labor importer jurisdiction taxes labor while the labor exporter subsidizes it. 57 For tax exporting also, local governments prefer an undistortive instrument such as a land tax to a distortive tax on labor.
In the present paper, the availability of an undistortive tax on land allows for both local budget balancing and tax exporting. Towns subsidize labor for a dierent reason that of internalizing trac congestion costs. This can be considered the rst-best or natural role of local labor taxation/subsidy in a MA.
Conclusion
This paper investigates how local governments such as municipalities address one of the biggest MA challenges: trac congestion. Trac congestion is a typical MA negative externality, similar to air, waste and noise pollutions, which results from the spatial agglomeration of jobs and household mobility. It is also considered a major problem by policy makers and economists due to its signicant costs (e.g. fuel, working time wasted, stress, maintenance of congested roads, greenhouse gas emissions).
The study develops a new urban tax competition model which links local public economics and urban economics models. The analysis shows that common local scal instruments may be used by municipalities to curb overwhelming trac congestion in MA centers. Specically, by charging high capital tax rates and low residential tax rates, the central city can make its business district less attractive to workers which reduces trac congestion. Since many public goods (e.g. safety, public hygiene and roads) are consumed not only by the municipality's residents but also by its workers, local public good provision can also be employed. To free up the MA's roads, the central city and the suburban towns respectively can reduce and increase their public good provision. The aforementioned instruments are however only second-best 55 See proposition 2 in Gaigné et al. (2016) . Notice that Gaigné et al. consider a poll tax on rms. However, since labor is the only input, the economic incidence of this tax is essentially similar to that of a labor tax.
tools; the paper shows that the most ecient way to regulate trac congestion is to allow suburban towns to provide rms with local labor subsidies.
Decentralized local labor subsidies could protably complement national (e.g. lane tolls, gasoline taxes) and regional (e.g. integrated public transport) solutions. These solutions often receive poor public support. 58 Local labor subsidies would be more acceptable; unlike congestion charges, they are perceived as a rewarding rather than a punitive instrument.
Moreover, local governments are better informed than higher level authorities about their residents' needs and can adapt their policies to their preferences. For instance, in a town where voters complain hugely about time spent every day stuck in trac jams, the local mayor will be nudged to develop the town's business district through the provision of labor subsidies.
In practice, local labor subsidies are critically missing, mainly because they are at odds with competition policy. Subsidies are strictly controlled by supranational authorities such as the European Commission, the World Trade Organization and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (OECD, 2010) . 59 In view of the signicant market failures in MAs, these local level restrictions would seem worthy of further consideration.
The easiest way to implement the subsidies recommended in this paper would be to let the residents of each town vote on the level of monetary subsidy per worker, and to provide the subsidy in the form of a tax credit to all local rms based on the number of their employees.
Notice that this scal instrument diers from most existing local development subsidies and tax credits, for instance in the US, that are often arbitrarily implemented by local governments and are based on multiple performance criteria rather than focusing on the number of employees. 60 An alternative solution is to subsidize workers rather than rms. For instance, town authorities could provide local workers with direct monetary subsidies or in-kind advantages such as luncheon vouchers, free parking places or public transport rebates.
The constantly growing economic signicance of MAs worldwide means that many important challenges hitherto considered national will need to be rethought at the metropolitan level. The paper contributes to this overall discussion by inviting national policy makers to reshape over-concentrated MAs to achieve greater polycentrism. Using (19) and (e.6) to eliminate Λ s i s i , Λ s i s i and Λ s i s i , (A.4)(A.7) become: 
A.2. Equilibrium land income
We can now derive the explicit form of the individual land income in equilibrium. To do so, we need to insert (A.2)(A.2) and (A.8)(A.11) into (A.1) and collect terms, as described in this subsection. Since land rent is constant within business districts and the land rent paid by suburban residents working where they live is symmetric on both side of the SBD (see Figure A .1), we have:
Then, from the aggregate land rent denition (A.1), we obtain: 
Then, replacing τ L c and τ L s i in (A.12) using the local budget constraints (20), and replacing L c and L s i using the land occupation condition (2), we obtain: 
Appendix B Proof of Result 1
The purpose of this section is to derive the municipalities' optimal policy rules when the tax instrument set includes a tax/subsidy on labor. Specically, we prove the towns' optimal policy rules (21a)(24a) in subsection B.1 and the city's optimal policy rules (21b)(24b) in subsection B.2. Before proceeding, recall that since F j is homogenous of degree 1, we have the following Euler's formulas for each X ∈ {W ; K, L}:
As explained in subsection 3.4, the equilibrium level of K c , K s , R c , R s , W c and W s are fully dened by the equations (e.1)(e.6) which are restated here for convenience:
where (A.20) is obtained by replacing T (l, l ), A, B and C by their denitions (7) and (3)(5) in (e.6).
B.1. Optimal policy rules of a town
In this subsection we prove the representative town's optimal policy rules (21a)(24a) when labor taxation/subsidy is available. The utility of the resident of s living the closest from her home town SBD is:
Replacing w s using (15), it follows that the municipalities' program is to maximize: The business land L s has been replaced into the production function using the land occupation condition (2).
From the above program, we can derive the rst-order conditions. The rst-order conditions with respect to τ R s , τ K s , τ W s and G s are respectively:
The rst-order condition with respect to R s is:
The rst-order condition with respect to K s is:
And, the rst-order condition with respect to W s is:
The rst-order conditions with respect to the tax instruments (A.25)(A.27) entail:
Then, using Euler's identities (A.18) and substituting L s from (2), we have: 
B.2. Optimal policy rules of the city
In this subsection we prove the city's optimal policy rules (21b)(24b) when labor taxation/subsidy is available. Since the central municipality regards all towns as symmetric, the aggregate land rent becomes:
The utility of the resident of c living the closest from the CBD is:
x cc + U c + U cc , 39 taxes, traffic jam and spillover and her budget constraint is:
x cc + ρ(−A) = w c + rk + Γ − τ R c .
with ρ(−A) = F c L . Replacing w c and r using (15) and (16), it follows that the municipalities' program is to maximize: The rst-order condition with respect to R c is:
The rst-order condition with respect to K c is:
The rst-order condition with respect to W c is:
The rst-order condition with respect to W s is:
We can now prove the optimal behavior rules when labor taxes are available (21b)(24b).
The rst-order conditions with respect to the tax instruments (A.39)(A.42) imply:
which can also be written as: The rst-order conditions with respect to the tax instruments (A.25) and (A.26), and condition (A.62) entail:
Then, using Euler's identities (A.18) and substituting L s from (2), we have: Inserting the rst-order conditions with respect to the tax instruments (A.25) and (A.26) into the rst-order condition with respect to labor respectively of the city (A.46) and the town (A.47), substituting L j , j ∈ {c; s} from (2) and using Euler's theorem entails: 
which can also be written as:
using conditions (A.22)(A.24) and K = kP. Then, using Euler's identities (A.18) and substituting L j , j ∈ {c; s} from (2), we have: 
